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Saturday, March 8, 2008
U.S. relations with Indonesia feature alongside relations with such countries as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan on the long list of Washington's priority dilemmas created by the security paradigm overhaul after Sept. 11, 2001. Indonesia is a willing and vital partner in the war on terrorism; yet it is also a country whose uppermost institutions, namely the government and the military, carry ignominious histories that disallow full and strong alliances Washington wishes to form with its global coalition partners. As the administration of President George W. Bush rethinks its policy toward various governments, the question it confronts is this: how can the United States fight the war against terrorism without compromising the very values it hopes to disseminate across the globe?
In the case of Indonesia, Washington's predicament stems not from the repressive nature of a regime Washington now considers a friend as in the case of Central Asian countries, but from the military that is at once the source of stability and brutality. The support of Indonesia - a large, moderate Islamic country grappling with democratic transition - is crucial for the United States and its campaign against terrorism. However, in 1999, the Clinton administration banned all joint military training and commercial arms sales to Indonesia out concern over its military's human rights violations, thereby severely curtailing the current Bush administration's ability to enlist adequate military cooperation from Indonesia. Thus the conundrum: should the United States do whatever necessary to fight terrorism and scrap the congressional ban, or maintain its stance on human rights and settle for less than desired level of cooperation? Alternatively, how could the United States best engage in global counterterrorism within the means currently available?
Democratization and military reform
Indonesia embarked on the path toward democracy in 1998, when the dictatorship of Gen. Suharto collapsed amidst widespread social discontent and a severe economic downturn. Abdurrahman Wahid became the first democratically elected president in 1999, and Megawati Sukarnoputri took over Wahid's weak government in July 2001. After decades of autocratic rule under Suharto, the task of decentralizing state power is proving to be a slow and difficult one. The process has been particularly tricky for the Indonesian military as it gradually relinquishes seats in the national parliament and shifts over to civilian control. While a return to authoritarianism is kept out of the question, three years of experimentation with democracy have left most people convinced that the military, known as the TNI, is the only institution that can sustain the nation amidst the lawlessness, corruption and regional violence that broke loose at the fall of dictatorship. Indeed, next to the country's weak and nascent civilian institutions and civil society, the TNI arguably remains the strongest and most influential body in Indonesian society.
Megawati is unlikely to yield free rein to the military in domestic politics; yet many, including some of the most avid reformers, now contend that a strong military presence in politics would help stabilize the country during this highly precarious transitional phase. Debate on the role of the military has been further augmented in the aftermath of Sept. 11. The onset of democratization after 1998 has been accompanied by a proliferation of Islamist political parties and groups, and many Indonesians and Western leaderships see the secular TNI as the effective counterbalancing factor to the threat of Islamic extremism. Strengthening the TNI may jeopardize the precedence of the rule of law, the argument goes, but it would at least help in suppressing domestic terrorism that has long plagued the archipelago.
U.S.-Indonesia military relations
The U.S. Department of Defense has been openly advocating the restoration of full military-to-military relations with Indonesia for some time. Unsurprisingly, that call has become more vociferous since Washington began co-opting the participation of governments and militaries of various forms and ideologies in the campaign against terror. For many in the Bush administration, U.S. engagement with the Indonesian military would serve at least two critical purposes.
First, some practical security reasons: full cooperation with Indonesia would facilitate the crackdown on Southeast Asian terrorist networks. The region was identified as a hotbed of terrorists soon after Sept. 11, when investigations led to fresh discoveries of terrorist evidence in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Had Washington not had the congressional ban on relations with the TNI, Indonesia may well have joined Yemen, Georgia and the Philippines as recipients of direct U.S. military training and aid for counterterrorism purposes. Furthermore, the military has not fully handed over internal security responsibilities to the police and thus still "has the only real database on Islamic extremists." Washington's limited relations with the TNI may therefore be obstructing deeper intelligence sharing, which is fundamental for successful counterterrorism.
Second, and more an argument based on values and principles: stronger U.S. ties with the TNI, U.S. officials claim, is likely the best way to transform the military with a notorious record of human rights abuses. Since Washington ended Indonesian participation in its International Military and Education Training (IMET) program in 1991, a generation of TNI officers has missed out on U.S. military and human rights education, as well as on opportunities to befriend American officers who could have served as exemplars. A resumption of the IMET for the Indonesian forces would not only help them rebuild its damaged reputation and credibility, they argue, it would also inculcate values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the next generation of TNI officials.
Persisting concerns
However, major concerns remain: this is the same military that received worldwide condemnation in 1999, when its Army conducted a campaign of terror and violence against pro-independence supporters in East Timor, killing more than 1,000 people and creating a refugee crisis. This is the military that is known at home and abroad for its erratically oppressive modus operandi. Indonesians for decades both valued and feared their military as the "guardian of the nation" that kept the culturally and ethnically diverse archipelago of more than 17,000 islands solidified as one nation. In short, this is a military with which United States would need to exercise great caution.
As the country transitions to democracy, the TNI is also transitioning from that infamous "guardian" role to that of an "instrument of national defense." It is attempting to rectify its image by implementing law and human rights courses at its army-officer academy; it is slowly relinquishing its nonmilitary powers to the police and other civilian authorities; and Jakarta is now putting on trial a handful of soldiers held responsible for the 1999 massacre in East Timor in what has become Indonesia's first human rights court. Yet, human rights groups still reserve some of their harshest criticisms of rights abuses for the Indonesian armed forces. The U.S. State Department itself acknowledged, in an annual human rights report released in March, "members of both the TNI and the police committed numerous serious human rights abuses." It also noted, "TNI personnel often responded with indiscriminate violence after physical attacks on soldiers. They also continued to conduct 'sweeps' that led to killing of civilians and property destruction." This is hardly the appropriate description of a military to which the United States would want to entrust its lethal arms and weapons, whether for counterterrorism or other activities.
Priorities and options
The current law restricting U.S. military training for Indonesian forces (Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002, HR 2506) stipulates that Indonesia must first prosecute those responsible for atrocities in East Timor, ensure the safe return of East Timorese refugees, and protect East Timor from all TNI operations before bilateral military relations can be restored.
Pentagon officials are keen to see the law removed. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in May, "I think it is unfortunate that the U.S. does not have military-to-military relationships with Indonesia," and that it is time for restrictions "to be adjusted substantially" because "Indonesia is an important country, it is a large country, it is a moderate Muslim state, [and] they are addressing the human rights issues in an orderly, democratic way." The State Department is more wary of easing restrictions. Officials emphasize the importance of bringing to justice those responsible for the bloody rampage in East Timor and question the extent to which U.S. military training can "transform" foreign soldiers and instill Western notions of rights and freedom.
What Washington's predicament comes down to is that this is an issue of recognizing U.S. priorities. The campaign against terrorism is today the overriding framework for understanding foreign policy. However, the United States cannot abandon former priorities and values in the name of anti-terrorism at a time when keeping friends and allies is more important than ever. Traditionally, Washington has kept some distance diplomatically, militarily, commercially or financially from "rogue states" that develop and disseminate weapons of mass destruction; institutional abusers of human rights and oppressors of individual freedom; and states that harbor terrorists. In the post-Sept. 11 world, reinstituting and reemphasizing these standards has become more, not less, important precisely because weapons of mass destruction, state-level oppression and harboring of terrorists are increasingly becoming parts of the same broad problem that has been dubbed the war on terrorism.
That said, it would be unwise for Washington to lift the congressional ban on military aid to the TNI in the name of fighting terrorism, and the Bush administration is unlikely to do so in the near future despite strong pressure from the Pentagon. As an Indonesian general said before a U.S. audience, "Indonesians need to feel that the United States is a true ally of the Indonesian people." As he pointed out, this can be achieved by aiding indigenous counterterrorism efforts through police training, intelligence sharing, and training in money-laundering surveillance; facilitating and encouraging political reform and socioeconomic improvement; imparting the message that the West is a friend of Islam; persistently condemning abuses of human rights; and insisting abidance by the rule of law. All of these are achievable within the existing U.S.-Indonesia legal framework.
The general also stated that the United States has "the responsibility to make sure that Indonesia is given space to find its way, in its own time" to deal with its own concerns. Indonesia does not wish its counterterrorism agenda, which is often blurred with domestic separatist problems, to be hijacked by Washington; rather, it seeks the maneuverability to fight terrorism on its own, with strong backing from the global coalition.
Fighting terror is at the forefront of the U.S. agenda. The battle is not won by neglecting other priorities, but by persistently safeguarding them amidst the global turbulence generated by the threat of terrorism.
By Reyko Huang
CDI Research Analyst
sumber: http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/priority.cfm
In the case of Indonesia, Washington's predicament stems not from the repressive nature of a regime Washington now considers a friend as in the case of Central Asian countries, but from the military that is at once the source of stability and brutality. The support of Indonesia - a large, moderate Islamic country grappling with democratic transition - is crucial for the United States and its campaign against terrorism. However, in 1999, the Clinton administration banned all joint military training and commercial arms sales to Indonesia out concern over its military's human rights violations, thereby severely curtailing the current Bush administration's ability to enlist adequate military cooperation from Indonesia. Thus the conundrum: should the United States do whatever necessary to fight terrorism and scrap the congressional ban, or maintain its stance on human rights and settle for less than desired level of cooperation? Alternatively, how could the United States best engage in global counterterrorism within the means currently available?
Democratization and military reform
Indonesia embarked on the path toward democracy in 1998, when the dictatorship of Gen. Suharto collapsed amidst widespread social discontent and a severe economic downturn. Abdurrahman Wahid became the first democratically elected president in 1999, and Megawati Sukarnoputri took over Wahid's weak government in July 2001. After decades of autocratic rule under Suharto, the task of decentralizing state power is proving to be a slow and difficult one. The process has been particularly tricky for the Indonesian military as it gradually relinquishes seats in the national parliament and shifts over to civilian control. While a return to authoritarianism is kept out of the question, three years of experimentation with democracy have left most people convinced that the military, known as the TNI, is the only institution that can sustain the nation amidst the lawlessness, corruption and regional violence that broke loose at the fall of dictatorship. Indeed, next to the country's weak and nascent civilian institutions and civil society, the TNI arguably remains the strongest and most influential body in Indonesian society.
Megawati is unlikely to yield free rein to the military in domestic politics; yet many, including some of the most avid reformers, now contend that a strong military presence in politics would help stabilize the country during this highly precarious transitional phase. Debate on the role of the military has been further augmented in the aftermath of Sept. 11. The onset of democratization after 1998 has been accompanied by a proliferation of Islamist political parties and groups, and many Indonesians and Western leaderships see the secular TNI as the effective counterbalancing factor to the threat of Islamic extremism. Strengthening the TNI may jeopardize the precedence of the rule of law, the argument goes, but it would at least help in suppressing domestic terrorism that has long plagued the archipelago.
U.S.-Indonesia military relations
The U.S. Department of Defense has been openly advocating the restoration of full military-to-military relations with Indonesia for some time. Unsurprisingly, that call has become more vociferous since Washington began co-opting the participation of governments and militaries of various forms and ideologies in the campaign against terror. For many in the Bush administration, U.S. engagement with the Indonesian military would serve at least two critical purposes.
First, some practical security reasons: full cooperation with Indonesia would facilitate the crackdown on Southeast Asian terrorist networks. The region was identified as a hotbed of terrorists soon after Sept. 11, when investigations led to fresh discoveries of terrorist evidence in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Had Washington not had the congressional ban on relations with the TNI, Indonesia may well have joined Yemen, Georgia and the Philippines as recipients of direct U.S. military training and aid for counterterrorism purposes. Furthermore, the military has not fully handed over internal security responsibilities to the police and thus still "has the only real database on Islamic extremists." Washington's limited relations with the TNI may therefore be obstructing deeper intelligence sharing, which is fundamental for successful counterterrorism.
Second, and more an argument based on values and principles: stronger U.S. ties with the TNI, U.S. officials claim, is likely the best way to transform the military with a notorious record of human rights abuses. Since Washington ended Indonesian participation in its International Military and Education Training (IMET) program in 1991, a generation of TNI officers has missed out on U.S. military and human rights education, as well as on opportunities to befriend American officers who could have served as exemplars. A resumption of the IMET for the Indonesian forces would not only help them rebuild its damaged reputation and credibility, they argue, it would also inculcate values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the next generation of TNI officials.
Persisting concerns
However, major concerns remain: this is the same military that received worldwide condemnation in 1999, when its Army conducted a campaign of terror and violence against pro-independence supporters in East Timor, killing more than 1,000 people and creating a refugee crisis. This is the military that is known at home and abroad for its erratically oppressive modus operandi. Indonesians for decades both valued and feared their military as the "guardian of the nation" that kept the culturally and ethnically diverse archipelago of more than 17,000 islands solidified as one nation. In short, this is a military with which United States would need to exercise great caution.
As the country transitions to democracy, the TNI is also transitioning from that infamous "guardian" role to that of an "instrument of national defense." It is attempting to rectify its image by implementing law and human rights courses at its army-officer academy; it is slowly relinquishing its nonmilitary powers to the police and other civilian authorities; and Jakarta is now putting on trial a handful of soldiers held responsible for the 1999 massacre in East Timor in what has become Indonesia's first human rights court. Yet, human rights groups still reserve some of their harshest criticisms of rights abuses for the Indonesian armed forces. The U.S. State Department itself acknowledged, in an annual human rights report released in March, "members of both the TNI and the police committed numerous serious human rights abuses." It also noted, "TNI personnel often responded with indiscriminate violence after physical attacks on soldiers. They also continued to conduct 'sweeps' that led to killing of civilians and property destruction." This is hardly the appropriate description of a military to which the United States would want to entrust its lethal arms and weapons, whether for counterterrorism or other activities.
Priorities and options
The current law restricting U.S. military training for Indonesian forces (Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002, HR 2506) stipulates that Indonesia must first prosecute those responsible for atrocities in East Timor, ensure the safe return of East Timorese refugees, and protect East Timor from all TNI operations before bilateral military relations can be restored.
Pentagon officials are keen to see the law removed. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in May, "I think it is unfortunate that the U.S. does not have military-to-military relationships with Indonesia," and that it is time for restrictions "to be adjusted substantially" because "Indonesia is an important country, it is a large country, it is a moderate Muslim state, [and] they are addressing the human rights issues in an orderly, democratic way." The State Department is more wary of easing restrictions. Officials emphasize the importance of bringing to justice those responsible for the bloody rampage in East Timor and question the extent to which U.S. military training can "transform" foreign soldiers and instill Western notions of rights and freedom.
What Washington's predicament comes down to is that this is an issue of recognizing U.S. priorities. The campaign against terrorism is today the overriding framework for understanding foreign policy. However, the United States cannot abandon former priorities and values in the name of anti-terrorism at a time when keeping friends and allies is more important than ever. Traditionally, Washington has kept some distance diplomatically, militarily, commercially or financially from "rogue states" that develop and disseminate weapons of mass destruction; institutional abusers of human rights and oppressors of individual freedom; and states that harbor terrorists. In the post-Sept. 11 world, reinstituting and reemphasizing these standards has become more, not less, important precisely because weapons of mass destruction, state-level oppression and harboring of terrorists are increasingly becoming parts of the same broad problem that has been dubbed the war on terrorism.
That said, it would be unwise for Washington to lift the congressional ban on military aid to the TNI in the name of fighting terrorism, and the Bush administration is unlikely to do so in the near future despite strong pressure from the Pentagon. As an Indonesian general said before a U.S. audience, "Indonesians need to feel that the United States is a true ally of the Indonesian people." As he pointed out, this can be achieved by aiding indigenous counterterrorism efforts through police training, intelligence sharing, and training in money-laundering surveillance; facilitating and encouraging political reform and socioeconomic improvement; imparting the message that the West is a friend of Islam; persistently condemning abuses of human rights; and insisting abidance by the rule of law. All of these are achievable within the existing U.S.-Indonesia legal framework.
The general also stated that the United States has "the responsibility to make sure that Indonesia is given space to find its way, in its own time" to deal with its own concerns. Indonesia does not wish its counterterrorism agenda, which is often blurred with domestic separatist problems, to be hijacked by Washington; rather, it seeks the maneuverability to fight terrorism on its own, with strong backing from the global coalition.
Fighting terror is at the forefront of the U.S. agenda. The battle is not won by neglecting other priorities, but by persistently safeguarding them amidst the global turbulence generated by the threat of terrorism.
By Reyko Huang
CDI Research Analyst
sumber: http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/priority.cfm
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