Military of Indonesia

Military of Indonesia
Armed Forces of Indonesia (Indonesian: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI , formerly Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, best known by the acronym ABRI comprises approximately 400,000 personnel including the Army (TNI-AD), Navy (including marines) (TNI-AL) , and Air Force (TNI-AU).[citation needed]

The army is by far the largest, with about 300.000 active-duty personnel, compared to around 71,000 in the Navy and 29,000 in the Air Force.[citation needed]

Defense spending in the national budget is less than 1% of GDP, but is supplemented by revenue from many military-run businesses and foundations, both legal and illegal. The force doesn't include paramilitary personnel such as BRIMOB [police mobile brigade], MENWA [university student regiment], and HANSIP [civilian defence].

Sumber: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Indonesia

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Interests rule as SBY

Vested interests rule as SBY condones forest plundering

Rendi Akhmad Witular, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The "only" courageous move taken by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono during his 3.5 years in office was his recent policy to broadly accommodate corporate greed, camouflaging itself as a policy of protection for the country's forests.

The recent issue of Government Regulation No. 2/2008, which governs the types of state income from non-tax revenue in the use of forest areas for non-forestry related businesses, has provided a glimpse of the real faces of the devils among the President's men.

The decree, signed Feb. 4, provides a broad license for companies to exploit protected forests as long as they are willing to pay annual rental fees ranging from Rp 1.2 million (US$125) to Rp 3 million per hectare.

Yudhoyono has defended the decree as being merely a follow-up to previous decrees that endorsed 13 mining firms to operate in protected forests, as well as to encourage the mining firms to immediately contribute to state revenue.

By this time his argument is clear -- the 13 firms are the primary target of the decree, no less, no more.

However, the decree has not actually been specifically designed for the 13 mining firms, because there are no clauses specifically referring to any arrangement for the firms, with instead just general mentions of the entire mining sector.

The decree will open up access to the forest for the exploitation of oil and gas, the building of electricity transmission towers and the construction of turnpikes.

With all these serious inconsistencies, one may assume Yudhoyono has deceived the public to protect the interests of businesspeople and people close to him.

Should this turn out to be true, it would lead to a serious political and legal imbroglio for the President, especially as he gears up to run for a second term next year.

Another assumption is that the President's disputatious argument may result from his lack of understanding of the decree's contents, getting only a one-sided version of the story whispered into his ear by aides who may have a personal interest in the decree.

High-ranking officials at the Forestry Ministry said unlike previous decrees, which involved various stakeholders including environmentalists, the recent decree was treated confidentially and was drafted hastily.

Agencies primarily involved in drafting the decree included the Forestry Ministry's planning agency and the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry's directorate general for mining.

Officials reported coming under intense pressure during the drafting of the decree, especially from vested interests related to mining and energy companies, tollway moguls and independent power-generation companies.

On the other side, as chairman of the Star and Crescent Party (PBB), Forestry Minister Malam Sambat Kaban wants to bring in as many supporters as possible because his party failed to meet the minimum electoral threshold in the last elections.

PBB had to change its name and also had to re-register with the Justice and Human Rights Ministry.

Given his political position, Kaban is unlikely to stand up to much pressure, especially when it comes from his ministerial colleagues and superiors.

In Yudhoyono's Cabinet, coincidentally, Vice President Jusuf Kalla has a family business engaged in the construction of tollways and power generation, while the coordinating minister for people's welfare has a family business in the mining and energy sector, as well as telecommunications.

Illegal logging has remained common throughout the country, despite numerous laws and regulations enacted to enforce the sustainable management of our forest resources, and this recent decree seems to undermine whatever progress has been made in this area.

There also are questions about the urgency of the decree, considering the 13 mining companies already granted forest concessions have not demanded the government immediately allow them to operate.

The government is also not cash-strapped and in need of immediately filling its coffers with any available revenue.

Despite the country's lack of infrastructure for supervising forests, the enactment of the decree will only exacerbate illegal logging, especially with the government providing legal leeway for the crime to occur.

The decree will only profit vested interests, not the general public.

sumber: http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailheadlines.asp?fileid=20080301.B02&irec=3

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HANKAM Ministry

HANKAM Ministry of Defense and Security

In 1985 a major reorganization separated the Ministry of Defense and Security [HANKAM] from the ABRI headquarters and staff. HANKAM was responsible for planning, acquisition, and management tasks but had no command or control of troop units. The ABRI commander in chief retained command and control of all armed forces and continued by tradition to be the senior military officer in the country. Since the separation of the ministry from the armed forces headquarters in 1985, the HANKAM staff has been composed largely of retired military personnel. The split provided positions of responsibility for highly qualified but relatively young retired officers of the Generation of 1945 while also opening up highlevel billets in ABRI to younger active-duty officers who had been frustrated by slow rates of promotion.

The administrastive structure of HANKAM consisted of a minister, secretary general, inspector general, three directorates general and a number of functional centers and institutes. The minister, inspector general, and three directors general were retired senior military officers; the secretary general (who acted as deputy minister) and most functional center chiefs were active-duty military officers.

sumber: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/hankam.htm

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President Security Forces

President Security Forces / PASPAMPRES

The formation date of President Security Forces (Paspampres) is based on the rescue operation of then-President Sukarno, then-VP Moh. Hatta, then-PM Sutan Syahrir and several ministers and high ranking officials from Jakarta to Yogyakarta on January 3, 1946. This operation was based on the safety concerns of the President and VP from the allied forces intimidations in Jakarta. The rescue operation was conducted using Special Railway Train.



Currently the Security Operation team of Paspampres consist of three groups: A, B, and C. Groups A and B are responsible for securing President and Vice President respectively. Group C is responsible for securing visiting foreign Head of State in Indonesia. Today Paspampres has the strength of about 2,500 personnels.

sumber: http://indonesiaeliteforces.tripod.com/id11.html

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ABRI - Armed Forces

ABRI - Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia

Indonesia's four armed services, collectively termed the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia [ABRI - Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia], consist of the three military services--the army, navy, and air force--and the police. The effort to forge a united and coherent nation that could accommodate the natural diversity of peoples in the Indonesian archipelago has always been a central theme in the country's history. ABRI plays a role in national society that is perhaps unique in the world. The military establishment in the early 1990s was involved in many affairs of state that elsewhere were not normally associated with military forces and acknowledged as the dominant political institution in the country. The armed forces establishment, led by the dominant branch, the army, has been the country's premier institution since 1966 when, in its own view, it answered the summons of the people and moved to the center stage of national life. Comprising the three military services and the police, the armed forces operated according to dwifungsi, or dual function, a doctrine of their own evolution, under which they undertook a double role as both defenders of the nation and as a social-political force in national development.

To fully understand the role of the armed forces in contemporary Indonesian society, one must understand the absolute priority the government and the military leadership has placed, from the beginning of the New Order, on the importance of internal security to the achievement of national stability. The New Order government, whose military leaders played an important role in 1965 in crushing what was officially described as a communist coup attempt, believed that threats to internal stability were the greatest threats to national security. Having experienced two attempted coups, supposedly communist-inspired, a number of regional separatist struggles, and instability created by radical religious movements, the government had little tolerance for public disorder.

Since the beginning of Suharto's rise to power in 1965, the armed forces accepted and supported the foundation of his regime, namely, the belief that economic and social development was the nation's first priority and that social and political stability was absolutely essential if that goal were to be achieved. The primary mission of the armed forces has therefore been to maintain internal stability. The maintenance of internal security was considered an integral part of national defense itself. Indonesian doctrine considers national defense within the broader context of "national resilience," a concept that stresses the importance of the ideological, political, economic, social, and military strength of the nation. Like dwifungsi, this concept has also legitimized activities of the armed forces in areas not ordinarily considered belonging to the military sphere.

The role of the separate armed services has not changed since 1969, when the heads of the army, navy, and air force were reduced to chiefs of staff. Operational control of almost all their military units was vested in the commander in chief, reducing the headquarters of each military service to the status of administrative organs. Only the police chief continued to exercise operational control over his own personnel.

Communist victories in South Vietnam and Cambodia prompted national authorities to reconsider both the external threat the nation faced and how best to meet it. Consequently, the new minister of defense and security, General Mohammad Jusuf, directed a major upgrading of armed forces military capabilities. This upgrade included increased training and procurement of sufficient equipment and personnel to establish a core of some 100 fully ready combat battalions. Under Jusuf, the armed forces initiated extensive retraining and reorganization programs that culminated in a major reorganization of the armed forces in 1985.

Largely retained intact when split off from HANKAM in 1985, the ABRI staff and its functions remained directly subordinate to the commander in chief, who remained, in turn, directly responsible to the president, also the supreme commander of the armed forces. Under the commander in chief, there was a provision for a deputy, a position that in 1992 was not filled. There were two ABRI chiefs of staff, one for the general staff and one for social-political affairs. The inspector general and the assistant for plans and budget, as well as a number of agencies and institutes, remained directly under the commander in chief. The ABRI chief of general staff directed assistants for communications/electronics, intelligence, logistics, operations, personnel, public security affairs, and territorial affairs, the chief of staff for social-political affairs directed the armed forces' dwifungsi operations in the civilian sector of the government through assistants for nonmilitary workers' affairs and for social-political affairs. The ABRI joint staff supported the headquarters of each of the four services. Staff personnel were drawn from all four services. Police officers served only in positions related to internal security.

sumber:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/abri.htm

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Indonesian Elite Forces

Introduction to Indonesian Elite Forces

The history of Indonesian special forces units begins when in 1952 Col. Alex Kawilarang, the commander of the 3rd Military District (Siliwangi), established a small commando-qualified unit which later will be known as Kopassus. Following its founding, several other special forces units came into existence. (Several important figures of these special forces are listed in the 'Prominent Figures' section).

Today, the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) operates several highly-trained special forces. The army has Kopassus, Kostrad and Raiders; the navy has Marines and Kopaska; the air force has Paskhas; and the police has Brimob.

Within these special forces, there are elite units that are trained to operate mainly as Anti-Terrorist/Counter-Terrorist forces. Kopassus has Sat-81 Gultor, Marines has Denjaka and Yontaifib, Paskhas has Den Bravo-90, and Brimob has Gegana and Detasemen-88.

Kostrad-own Tontaipur and Marines' Yontaifib are elite units that serve different purpose. Tontaipur and Yontaifib are trained to do combat and surveillance operations against enemy combatants. Kopaska also has the same skills as Tontaipur and Yontaifib units, but, in addition to that, Kopaska has been trained since the very beginning to operate as a counter-terrorist unit on or below water.

The elite units of TNI and Indonesian Police all have been qualified as commando units. The basic qualifications of being a commando include combat intelligence, anti-guerilla warfare, jungle warfare, jungle survival, reconnaissance operation, night infiltration, hand-in-hand combat, beach-landing operation, diving, airborne, and long-march. Further qualifications include combat free-fall, advance diving, sniper, mountaineering, computer expert, psychological warfare, and ethnic/foreign languages.

sumber ; http://indonesiaeliteforces.tripod.com/id1.html

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Law enforcement in Indonesia

Law enforcement in Indonesia
The Indonesian National Police is the official police force for Indonesia. It had formerly been a part of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia since its independence from the Dutch. The police were formally separated from the military in April 1999, a process which was formally completed in July 2000 [1]. With 150,000 personnel, the police form a much smaller portion of the population than in most nations. The total number of national and local police in 2006 was approximately 470,000.

The strength of the Indonesian National Police stood at approximately 285,000 in 2004. The national police force was formally separated as a branch of the armed forces and placed under the Office of the President in 1999. It also includes 12,000 marine police and an estimated 40,000 People’s Security (Kamra) trainees who serve as a police auxiliary and report for three weeks of basic training each year.
History

When large parts of Indonesia was under Dutch colonial occupation until 1940s, police duties were performed by either military establishments or colonial police known as the veldpolitie or the field police.[citation needed] Japanese occupation during WW II brought changes when the Japanese formed various armed organizations to support their war. This had led to the distribution of weapons to military trained youths, which were largely confiscated from the Dutch armory.

After the Japanese occupation, the national police became an armed organization.[citation needed] The Indonesian police was established in 1946, and its units fought in the Indonesian National Revolution against the invading Dutch forces. The police also participated in suppressing the 1948 communist revolt in Madiun. In 1966, the police was brought under the control of Armed Forces Chief. Following the proclamation of independence, the police played a vital role when they actively supported the people’s movement to dismantle the Japanese army, and to strengthen the defense of the newly created Republic of Indonesia. The police were not combatants who were required to surrender their weapons to the Allied Forces. During the revolution of independence, the police gradually formed into what is now known as Polisi Negara Republik Indonesia (Polri) or the Indonesian National Police. In 2000, the police force regained its independence and now is separate from the military.

Chief of Police

1. R Said Soekanto Tjokrodiatmodjo (29 September 1945-14 December 1959)
2. Soekarno Djojonegoro (15 December 1959-29 December 1963)
3. Soetjipto Danoekoesoemo (30 December 1963-8 May 1965)
4. Soetjipto Joedodihardjo (9 May 1965-8 May 1968)
5. Hoegeng Imam Santoso (9 May 1968-2 October 1971)
6. Moch. Hasan (3 October 1971-1974)
7. Widodo Budidarmo (1974-25 September 1978)
8. Awaluddin Djamin (26 September 1978-1982)
9. Anton Sudjarwo (1982-1986)
10. Moch. Sanoesi (1986-19 February 1991)
11. Kunarto (20 February 1991-April 1993)
12. Banurusman Astrosemitro (April 1993-March 1996)
13. Dibyo Widodo (March 1996-28 June 1998)
14. Roesmanhadi (29 June 1998-3 January 2000)
15. Roesdihardjo (4 January 2000-22 September 2000)
16. Suroyo Bimantoro (23 September 2000-28 November 2001)
17. Da'i Bachtiar (29 November 2001-7 July 2005)
18. Sutanto (8 July 2005-...)

Organization

Polri has a centralized command and divided into territorial forces i.e. provincial police (Kepolisian Daerah or Polda), regional police (Kepolisian Wilayah or Polwil), city or district police (Kepolisian Resort or Polres) and sub-district police (Kepolisian Sektor or Polsek). There are also some special branches i.e Brimob (mobile brigade) which have paramilitary role to conduct security stabilization operations and providing security protection for VIP or vital facilities, Polisi Udara or Air Police, Polisi Air or Marine Police, Forensics and Detachment 88, specially trained for anti-terrorist operations.

Ranks of Indonesian National Police

At their early years, Polri used European police style ranks like inspector and comissioner. When the police was included into military structure in the 1960s, the ranks changed into military style such as captain, major and colonel. When Polri conduct transition to be fully independent out of armed forces structure at 2000, they use British style police ranks like inspector and superintendent. Now Polri return to Dutch style ranks just like their early years.

Police rank

* General (four star)
* Comissioner General (three star)
* Inspector General (two star)
* Brigadier general (one star)
* Komisaris Besar (Chief Comissioner-formerly Colonel)
* Ajun Komisaris Besar (Adjutant Chief Comissioner-formerly Lieutenant Colonel)
* Komisaris (Comissioner-formerly Major)
* Ajun Komisaris (Adjutant Comissioner-formerly Captain)
* Inspektur Satu (Inspector 1st grade-formerly 1st Lieutenant)
* Inspektur Dua (Inspector 2nd grade-formerly 2nd Lieutenant)
* Ajun Inspektur Satu (Adjutant Inspector 1st grade)
* Ajun Inspektur Dua (Adjutant Inspector 2nd grade)
* Brigadir (Brigadier-formerly Sergeant Major)
* Brigadir Kepala (Chief Brigadier-formerly Chief Sergeant)
* Brigadir Satu (Brigadier 1st grade-formerly 1st Sergeant)
* Brigadir Dua (Brigadier 2nd grade-formerly 2nd Sergeant)
* Ajun Brigadir Kepala (Adjutant Chief Brigadier-formerly Chief Corporal)
* Ajun Brigadir Satu(Adjutant Brigadier 1st grade-formerly 1st Corporal)
* Ajun Brigadir Dua (Adjutant Brigadier 2nd grade-formerly 2nd Corporal)
* Bhayangkara Kepala(Chief Patrolman)
* Bhayangkara Satu (Patrolman 1st grade)
* Bhayangkara Dua (Patrolman 2nd grade)


sumber:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_enforcement_in_Indonesia

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Indonesian Air Force

Indonesian Air Force
History

[edit] Before Indonesian Independence (1941-1945)

After World War II ended, Indonesia became the second country (after Thailand/Siam) in South East Asia to acquire an Air Force capability. Indonesian pilots fought against the colonial forces of The Netherlands during 1945-1949 with former Japanese aircraft abandoned at the end of World War II, as well aircraft of the Netherlands East Indies Air Force (including Curtiss P-36 Mohawk, Brewster F2A Buffalo and Fokker D.XXI fighters; Glenn Martin B-10 bombers; Fokker C.X reconnaissance floatplanes) left before the occupation by Japan in 1941.

[edit] Indonesian War of Independence/The Netherlands 'Police Action' (1945-1949)

After the Japanese surrendered at the end of WW II, Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno declared Indonesian Independence on August 17th, 1945. Several days later, a People's Security Force (Badan Keamanan Rakyat) was formed to undertake security duties. The Air Division of this force was also formed, using ex-Japanese planes scattered everywhere, especially in the island of Java, including Bugis Air Base in Malang (situated in 18 September 1945). The most numerous of these airplanes were the Kawanishi K5Y1 Willow (Curen) trainers, which were hastily used to train newly recruited cadets. At the time of the founding, there was only 1 Indonesian holding a multi-engine pilot license from the pre-war Dutch Flying School (but never had any opportunity to fly during the 3.5-year Japanese occupation). He was assisted by a few Japanese pilots who decided to stay in the newly born country. The new roundel was created simply by painting white on the lower part of the Japanese Hinomaru, reflecting the red and white of the Indonesian flag. The People's Security Force was then re-organized to form a formal armed force. This marked the birth of the Indonesian Air Force on April 9th, 1946. However, tensions rose as the Dutch tried to re-claim her former colony and launched an assault in July 21st, 1947, destroying most of the planes on the ground. Some planes survived though and were hidden in remote bases.

July 29, 1947 was the first air operation by the newborn air force as 3 surviving aircraft, comprising 2 Kawanishi K5Y1 "Willows"(Curen) and a Mitsubishi Ki-51 "Sonia" (the fourth aircraft, a Nakajima Ki-43 "Oscar" (Hayabusha), should also have been involved in the raid, but as of when it was launched, the aircraft was not airworthy) conducted air raids at dawn on the Dutch Army barracks in Semarang, Salatiga and Ambarawa, dropping incendiary bombs. Tactically, these raids did not have any effect on the Dutch positions, but psychologically, it was a great success as it proved that the Indonesian Air Force still existed. The Dutch had previously claimed the destruction of Indonesian Air Force in their assault before and they never expected any attack from the sky. Dutch P-40E Warwhak tried to find all the guerrilas' plane, but they were too late to find those "ghost" aircraft which landed quickly in Maguwo Air Base, near Yogyakarta (now, Adi Sucipto Airport).

Here are the list of captured aircraft that Indonesian pro-independence guerrilas tried to save in remote areas :

Fighters

* Fokker D.XXI
* Curtiss P-36 Mohawk
* Brewster F2A Buffalo

* Vought F-4U Corsair= saved for decades in Kalijati Air Base. * Curtiss P-40E Warhawk= saved for decades in Kalijati Air Base. * Grumman F6F Hellcat= saved for decades in Kalijati Air Base. * Supermarine Spitfire= saved for decades in Kalijati Air Base.

* Kawanishi N1K1-J/N1K2-J Shiden "George"
* Kawasaki Ki-45 Toryu (Type 2 two-seat fighter) "Nick"
* Kawasaki Ki-61 Hien (Type 3 Fighter) "Tony"
* Kawasaki Ki-100 Hien (Type 5 Fighter) "Tony"
* Mitsubishi A5M "Claude"

* Mitsubishi A6M Zero-Sen "Zeke" = saved as a display in Museum Dirgantara Udara (near Adi Sucipto Airport Yogyakarta) and saved for decades in Kalijati Air Base.

* Mitsubishi J2M Raiden "Jack"

* Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa (Type 1 Fighter) "Oscar" = saved as a display in Museum Dirgantara Udara (near Adi Sucipto Airport Yogyakarta).

* Nakajima Ki-44 Shoki "Tojo"
* Nakajima Ki-84 Hayate (Type 4 Fighter) "Frank"

Attack Aircraft

* Aichi D3A "Val"
* Aichi B7A Ryusei "Grace"
* Mitsubishi Ki-15 "Babs"
* Nakajima B5N (Type 97 Carrier Attack Bomber) "Kate"
* Nakajima B6N Tenzan "Jill"
* Yokosuka D4Y "Judy"
* Yokosuka P1Y1 Ginga "Frances"

Bombers

* Glenn Martin B-10 = Flew for one or more than one mission with guerillas that used to work with KNIL (Dutch East Indies) before the occupation of Japan.
* Mitsubishi Ki-51 "Sonia" = Flew in July 29, 1947.
* Mitsubishi G3M "Nell"
* Mitsubishi G4M "Betty"
* Mitsubishi Ki-21 "Sally"
* Mitsubishi Ki-30 "Ann"
* Mitsubishi Ki-67 Hiryu "Peggy"
* Nakajima Ki-49 Donryu "Helen"

Floatplanes

* Fokker C.X
* Mitsubishi F-1M "Pete"

Trainer

* Kawanishi K5Y1 "Willows" = saved as a display in Museum Dirgantara Udara (near Adi Sucipto Airport Yogyakarta), in the garden of Museum Jogja Kembali, and in Museum TNI Satria Mandala in Jakarta. Flew in July 29, 1947.

With the pressure from the United Nations, the Dutch finally agreed to acknowledge Indonesian independence following the 1949 Round Table Conference, sovereignty was officially transferred to the United States of Indonesia. The Dutch armed forces left (but remained in West Papua until 1963) and the airplanes were handed over to the Indonesians. These comprised, among others, North American P-51 Mustang, North American B-25 Mitchell, Douglas A-26 Invader, Douglas C-47 Dakota and Consolidated PBY-5A Catalina, which served as the main forces of the Indonesian Air Force for the following decade. During this era, Indonesia received her first jet aircraft; De Havilland DH-115 Vampire. It was also during this era that the national roundels were changed to the red & white pentagon.
de Havilland Vampire of the Indonesian Air Force
de Havilland Vampire of the Indonesian Air Force

[edit] Action against rebellions (1950-1961)

The instability of the political condition had made Indonesian Air Force fought against several local rebels in Indonesia, such as PRRI-PERMESTA, Darul Islam-Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) and the Republic of South Maluku separatists. Several Indonesian pilot got their kill records for the first time, such as Capt. Ignatius Dewanto with his P-51 Mustang shot down AUREV/PRRI-PERMESTA's A-26 Invader (a rebel B-26 bomber was shot down on 18 May 1958 by Indonesian pilot Ignatius Dewanto over Ambon. Its pilot, an American CIA agent named Allen Lawrence Pope, was captured and put on trial in Jakarta where he exposed the deep involvement of CIA in the rebellion.). The most famous Indonesian fighter pilot during this time was Rusmin Nurjadin, who became Chief of the Air Staff in 1966 to 1969. He also known as one of the Squadron Leader of MiG-21 in 1962 to 1965 and Acrobatic Team founder in 1962 that flew MiG-17F/PF Fresco. Some of Indonesian pilots became aces as the results of their kill records in this era.

[edit] The Golden Era of Soviet Influence (1962-1965)
MiG-19 of the Indonesian Air Force
MiG-19 of the Indonesian Air Force

The rise of the communist party in Indonesia drew Indonesia closer to the Eastern Block. Several Soviet-built aircraft began to arrive in the early 60’s. Indonesia even became the first non-Soviet country to receive and operate the new Tu-16 Badger bombers. Up to 25 Tu-16 Badgers arrived and gave a great deterrent power when facing rebellions and confrontations. Several kinds of MiG also arrived comprising MiG-15UTI Fagot, MiG-17F/PF Fresco, MiG-19S Farmer and F-13 Fishbed, supported with Il-28 Beagle, Mi-4 Hound, Mi-6 Hook and An-12 Cub.Indonesia also received La-11. Some Tu-2 from China also arrived, intended to replace the B-25, but they never reached operational status. These aircraft served along with the remaining western aircraft such as B-25 Mitchell, A-26 Invader, C-47 Dakota, and P-51 Mustang. It was during this period that the Indonesian Air Force became the largest air force in the southern hemisphere.

This era also marked the last confrontation with the Dutch in Papua, before the Dutch, again under pressure of the United Nations, finally left in 1963. Indonesian Air Forces at this time had more modern and more numbers of aircraft than Dutch had. Several mission of USAF Taiwan-based Lockheed U-2 from 35th Squadron (Black Cat Squadron) flew over Maluku (Mollucas) and had reported to Dutch military that there was a big possibility that Dutch can lost their air superiority over Papua if they continued the war. Although Indonesia had won over this conflict in diplomatic way, several numbers of P-51,MiG-15,MiG-21 and C-47 downed in this short period conflict. But, the Dutch military agreed that Indonesia had more strength and powerful forces than they had ever predicted before the conflict.

In this period, Indonesian Air Force also took part in the confrontation with the Malaysian Federation (backed by the United Kingdom) along the border of Kalimantan, the Malacca Strait and near the Singapore Border. However, Indonesian lost more aircraft than had been shot down in the conflict in Papua.

Even though Indonesian Air Forces aircraft were Soviet-made during this era, Indonesia also bought 16 C-130 Hercules from the United States.

[edit] The September 30 movement and the Overthrow of Soekarno (1966-1970)

The coup attempt lead by the 30 September Movement in 1965 changed everything and a new anti-communist regime from the Army, led by Major General Suharto, took power. Ties with the Eastern block countries were cut, and thus support and spare parts for the planes became short. By the early 70’s most of the Eastern block planes were either grounded or scrapped. The largest air force in the southern hemisphere slowly but surely became one of the smallest. In this period, the Indonesian Air Force bought 16 units of Rockwell OV-10 Bronco for counter-intersurgency purpose. The Indonesian Air Force also took part in the 1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor (now Timor Leste).

[edit] Rebirth of the Indonesian Air Force (1970-1980)

Indonesia recovered soon by receiving ex-Royal Australian Air Force CAC Sabres to replace their MiG-21's.

Indonesia then purchased BAe Hawk Mk 53s from United Kingdom in the 1970's.

[edit] The Influence of Western Products (1980-1998)

Indonesia received 32 ex-Israeli A-4 Skyhawks between 1980 and 1982.. In 1982, Indonesia purchased 16 Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II from the United States to replace their North American Sabre's. These were upgraded in Belguim from 1995. After a tight competition for a new fighter bomber with Dassault Mirage 2000 from France during 1986 to 1988 (especially after the Indonesian Air Show in 1986), Indonesia bought 12 F-16A/B Fighting Falcon Block 15 OCU as a new fighter to strengthen the Indonesian Air Force in 1989. A total of 10 F-16A and F-16B are still in service with Indonesian Air Force: 2 planes crashed in two different accidents. However, only a few of these are still serviceable. The Indonesian Air Force ordered eight BAe Hawk Mk 109s and 16 Mk 209s in 1993. The last of these was delivered by January 1997.

[edit] TNI-AU Today (1998 - present)

In 1999, the Indonesian Military staged a military intervention following the East Timor's referendum. The result is more than 1,500 civilians killed and 70 percent of Dili's infrastructure razed. In response, the United States and the European Union both imposed arms embargoes. Although, The European Union chose not to renew its ban in 2000, The United States did not lift its embargo until November of 2005.

In 2002, Indonesian Air Force continued to use all of its assets against local separatists, such as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)). In the conflict with GAM in Aceh, the Indonesian Air Force utilized OV-10Fs for counter-insurgency actions along with BAe Hawk 53 and 209 with great success.

By 2005 the Air Force was in a logistical crisis. The F-16 Fighting Falcons and A-4 Skyhawk, which were accounted for 80% of its air combat asset, were at the minimum or nil level of combat readiness.

Surprisingly, in July of 2003, The Air Force managed to scramble two fully armed F-16 to intercept The U.S. Hornets over Bawaen Island off the Eastern coast of Java island. The incident was ended peaceful through a friendly or foe hand signal. A US spokesman told the naval aircraft had sought permission to enter Indonesian airspace while escorting a US aircraft carrier. But the request arrived too late at the air force defense headquarters in Jakarta due to red tape.

In that same year, The Air Force received two Su-27 Flankers and two Su-30 Flanker-Ds from KnAPO, Russia. The purchase, however, did not include any weaponary. Furthermore, in 2006, The Indonesian Air force obtained three Sukhoi Aerospace Su-27SKM Flankers, three Sukhoi Aerospace Su-30MK2 Flanker-Ds. 7 KT-1b Korean Basic Trainers were also purchased. Further 12 KT-1b were imported in 2006.

Other plans include purchasing a number of f-16 C/D to strengthen its F-16 squadron, newer C-130Js, advanced trainer/COIN aircrafts new radars, new logitical equipments both from Western and Russian manufacturers.

To date, the Indonesian Air Force has only acquired four types of missiles - the AS-1 Kennel (KS-1 Kometa), AIM-9 Sidewinder, AGM-65 Maverick and AA-2 Atoll (Vympel K-13). There are plans to purchase more advanced air-to-air missiles, such as AA-10 Alamo (Vympel R-27), AA-11 Archer (Vympel R-73), AA-12 Adder (Vympel R-77) and AA-X-13 Arrow (Vympel R-37), as well as other air-to-ground missiles (AS-14 Kedge), anti ship missiles (Zvezda Kh-31 and Zvezda Kh-59), general purpose bombs and cluster bombs from Russia, to strengthen their 5 Su-27SK and 5 Su-30MK2.

sumber: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_Air_Force

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Indonesian Navy

Indonesian Navy
History
Naval Jack of Indonesia
Naval Jack of Indonesia

The Indonesian Navy was formed in the year August 22, 1945. It was formed as the Agency of the People’s Security Sea Service (Badan Keamanan Rakyat-Laut). Later on October 5, 1945, BKR Laut became known as Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia (ALRI). This was later changed to Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut (TNI-AL) in the 1970.

Personnel of the Indonesian Navy is estimated at 57,197. The Indonesian Navy purchased a number of ships of the former East German navy in the 1990s. Navy vessels include KRI Cobra and others. In 2006, Indonesian Navy purchased 2 Kilo class - 636 conventional submarines, 2 Shipset Yakhont Missile and 20 BMP-3F amphibious light tank with option of 100 more BMP-3 from Russia. Indonesia also plans to buy landing craft ships from Russia.

[edit] Indonesian Navy Special Forces

KOPASKA

Denjaka

[edit] Ships of the Indonesian Navy

See also: Current Indonesian Navy ships

The majority of the vessels in the Indonesian navy are from Holland and Britain. However since 2003 Indonesian shipyards produce many of their own small vessels, in particular those of smaller displacement like patrol boats and fast attack crafts.

[edit] Future plans

The Indonesian Navy is modernizing the fleet. New corvettes ordered from Netherlands are being inducted.[1] The Navy also plans to induct 60 patrol vessels within a decade to maintain adequate force level while replacing obsolete ships in service. This will help in the fight against sea piracy and other maritime crime.[2]

[edit] References

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Indonesian navy receives first corvette from Netherlands
2. ^ Indonesian Navy plans fleet expansion
sumber: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_Navy

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Indonesia Feature

U.S. relations with Indonesia feature alongside relations with such countries as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan on the long list of Washington's priority dilemmas created by the security paradigm overhaul after Sept. 11, 2001. Indonesia is a willing and vital partner in the war on terrorism; yet it is also a country whose uppermost institutions, namely the government and the military, carry ignominious histories that disallow full and strong alliances Washington wishes to form with its global coalition partners. As the administration of President George W. Bush rethinks its policy toward various governments, the question it confronts is this: how can the United States fight the war against terrorism without compromising the very values it hopes to disseminate across the globe?

In the case of Indonesia, Washington's predicament stems not from the repressive nature of a regime Washington now considers a friend as in the case of Central Asian countries, but from the military that is at once the source of stability and brutality. The support of Indonesia - a large, moderate Islamic country grappling with democratic transition - is crucial for the United States and its campaign against terrorism. However, in 1999, the Clinton administration banned all joint military training and commercial arms sales to Indonesia out concern over its military's human rights violations, thereby severely curtailing the current Bush administration's ability to enlist adequate military cooperation from Indonesia. Thus the conundrum: should the United States do whatever necessary to fight terrorism and scrap the congressional ban, or maintain its stance on human rights and settle for less than desired level of cooperation? Alternatively, how could the United States best engage in global counterterrorism within the means currently available?


Democratization and military reform

Indonesia embarked on the path toward democracy in 1998, when the dictatorship of Gen. Suharto collapsed amidst widespread social discontent and a severe economic downturn. Abdurrahman Wahid became the first democratically elected president in 1999, and Megawati Sukarnoputri took over Wahid's weak government in July 2001. After decades of autocratic rule under Suharto, the task of decentralizing state power is proving to be a slow and difficult one. The process has been particularly tricky for the Indonesian military as it gradually relinquishes seats in the national parliament and shifts over to civilian control. While a return to authoritarianism is kept out of the question, three years of experimentation with democracy have left most people convinced that the military, known as the TNI, is the only institution that can sustain the nation amidst the lawlessness, corruption and regional violence that broke loose at the fall of dictatorship. Indeed, next to the country's weak and nascent civilian institutions and civil society, the TNI arguably remains the strongest and most influential body in Indonesian society.

Megawati is unlikely to yield free rein to the military in domestic politics; yet many, including some of the most avid reformers, now contend that a strong military presence in politics would help stabilize the country during this highly precarious transitional phase. Debate on the role of the military has been further augmented in the aftermath of Sept. 11. The onset of democratization after 1998 has been accompanied by a proliferation of Islamist political parties and groups, and many Indonesians and Western leaderships see the secular TNI as the effective counterbalancing factor to the threat of Islamic extremism. Strengthening the TNI may jeopardize the precedence of the rule of law, the argument goes, but it would at least help in suppressing domestic terrorism that has long plagued the archipelago.


U.S.-Indonesia military relations

The U.S. Department of Defense has been openly advocating the restoration of full military-to-military relations with Indonesia for some time. Unsurprisingly, that call has become more vociferous since Washington began co-opting the participation of governments and militaries of various forms and ideologies in the campaign against terror. For many in the Bush administration, U.S. engagement with the Indonesian military would serve at least two critical purposes.

First, some practical security reasons: full cooperation with Indonesia would facilitate the crackdown on Southeast Asian terrorist networks. The region was identified as a hotbed of terrorists soon after Sept. 11, when investigations led to fresh discoveries of terrorist evidence in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Had Washington not had the congressional ban on relations with the TNI, Indonesia may well have joined Yemen, Georgia and the Philippines as recipients of direct U.S. military training and aid for counterterrorism purposes. Furthermore, the military has not fully handed over internal security responsibilities to the police and thus still "has the only real database on Islamic extremists." Washington's limited relations with the TNI may therefore be obstructing deeper intelligence sharing, which is fundamental for successful counterterrorism.

Second, and more an argument based on values and principles: stronger U.S. ties with the TNI, U.S. officials claim, is likely the best way to transform the military with a notorious record of human rights abuses. Since Washington ended Indonesian participation in its International Military and Education Training (IMET) program in 1991, a generation of TNI officers has missed out on U.S. military and human rights education, as well as on opportunities to befriend American officers who could have served as exemplars. A resumption of the IMET for the Indonesian forces would not only help them rebuild its damaged reputation and credibility, they argue, it would also inculcate values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the next generation of TNI officials.


Persisting concerns

However, major concerns remain: this is the same military that received worldwide condemnation in 1999, when its Army conducted a campaign of terror and violence against pro-independence supporters in East Timor, killing more than 1,000 people and creating a refugee crisis. This is the military that is known at home and abroad for its erratically oppressive modus operandi. Indonesians for decades both valued and feared their military as the "guardian of the nation" that kept the culturally and ethnically diverse archipelago of more than 17,000 islands solidified as one nation. In short, this is a military with which United States would need to exercise great caution.

As the country transitions to democracy, the TNI is also transitioning from that infamous "guardian" role to that of an "instrument of national defense." It is attempting to rectify its image by implementing law and human rights courses at its army-officer academy; it is slowly relinquishing its nonmilitary powers to the police and other civilian authorities; and Jakarta is now putting on trial a handful of soldiers held responsible for the 1999 massacre in East Timor in what has become Indonesia's first human rights court. Yet, human rights groups still reserve some of their harshest criticisms of rights abuses for the Indonesian armed forces. The U.S. State Department itself acknowledged, in an annual human rights report released in March, "members of both the TNI and the police committed numerous serious human rights abuses." It also noted, "TNI personnel often responded with indiscriminate violence after physical attacks on soldiers. They also continued to conduct 'sweeps' that led to killing of civilians and property destruction." This is hardly the appropriate description of a military to which the United States would want to entrust its lethal arms and weapons, whether for counterterrorism or other activities.


Priorities and options

The current law restricting U.S. military training for Indonesian forces (Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002, HR 2506) stipulates that Indonesia must first prosecute those responsible for atrocities in East Timor, ensure the safe return of East Timorese refugees, and protect East Timor from all TNI operations before bilateral military relations can be restored.

Pentagon officials are keen to see the law removed. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in May, "I think it is unfortunate that the U.S. does not have military-to-military relationships with Indonesia," and that it is time for restrictions "to be adjusted substantially" because "Indonesia is an important country, it is a large country, it is a moderate Muslim state, [and] they are addressing the human rights issues in an orderly, democratic way." The State Department is more wary of easing restrictions. Officials emphasize the importance of bringing to justice those responsible for the bloody rampage in East Timor and question the extent to which U.S. military training can "transform" foreign soldiers and instill Western notions of rights and freedom.

What Washington's predicament comes down to is that this is an issue of recognizing U.S. priorities. The campaign against terrorism is today the overriding framework for understanding foreign policy. However, the United States cannot abandon former priorities and values in the name of anti-terrorism at a time when keeping friends and allies is more important than ever. Traditionally, Washington has kept some distance diplomatically, militarily, commercially or financially from "rogue states" that develop and disseminate weapons of mass destruction; institutional abusers of human rights and oppressors of individual freedom; and states that harbor terrorists. In the post-Sept. 11 world, reinstituting and reemphasizing these standards has become more, not less, important precisely because weapons of mass destruction, state-level oppression and harboring of terrorists are increasingly becoming parts of the same broad problem that has been dubbed the war on terrorism.

That said, it would be unwise for Washington to lift the congressional ban on military aid to the TNI in the name of fighting terrorism, and the Bush administration is unlikely to do so in the near future despite strong pressure from the Pentagon. As an Indonesian general said before a U.S. audience, "Indonesians need to feel that the United States is a true ally of the Indonesian people." As he pointed out, this can be achieved by aiding indigenous counterterrorism efforts through police training, intelligence sharing, and training in money-laundering surveillance; facilitating and encouraging political reform and socioeconomic improvement; imparting the message that the West is a friend of Islam; persistently condemning abuses of human rights; and insisting abidance by the rule of law. All of these are achievable within the existing U.S.-Indonesia legal framework.

The general also stated that the United States has "the responsibility to make sure that Indonesia is given space to find its way, in its own time" to deal with its own concerns. Indonesia does not wish its counterterrorism agenda, which is often blurred with domestic separatist problems, to be hijacked by Washington; rather, it seeks the maneuverability to fight terrorism on its own, with strong backing from the global coalition.

Fighting terror is at the forefront of the U.S. agenda. The battle is not won by neglecting other priorities, but by persistently safeguarding them amidst the global turbulence generated by the threat of terrorism.



By Reyko Huang
CDI Research Analyst

sumber: http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/priority.cfm

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Military Area

Military Area Commands

* Military Area Commands (Kodam), incorporating provincial and district commands each with a number of infantry battalions, sometimes a cavalry battalion, artillery, or engineers[1]. Currently there are 12 Military Commands, and those are:
o Kodam Iskandar Muda, overseeing Aceh province as part of the Aceh special autonomy law. Previously under the Kodam I/Bukit Barisan.
o Kodam I/Bukit Barisan, overseeing northern Sumatra provinces of North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau and Riau Islands.
o Kodam II/Sriwijaya, overseeing southern provinces on Sumatra island of Jambi, Bengkulu, Bangka Belitung, South Sumatra and Lampung.
o Kodam Jaya, overseeing Jakarta as the capital city of Indonesia. Kodam Jaya also oversees two regions outside Jakarta of Bekasi which actually in West Java province and Tangerang which is in Banten province.
o Kodam III/Siliwangi, overseeing West Java and Banten provinces.
o Kodam IV/Diponegoro, overseeing Central Java and Yogyakarta provinces.
o Kodam V/Brawijaya, overseeing East Java province.
o Kodam VI/Tanjungpura, overseeing all provinces on Kalimantan island (Borneo) of Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and West Kalimantan.
o Kodam VII/Wirabuana, overseeing all provinces on Sulawesi island of Gorontalo, Central Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi and West Sulawesi.
o Kodam IX/Udayana, overseeing provinces of Bali, East Nusa Tenggara and West Nusa Tenggara. Former Indonesian province of East Timor was also under the jurisdiction of Kodam IX/Udayana.
o Kodam XVI/Pattimura, overseeing Maluku and North Maluku provinces.
o Kodam XVII/Trikora, overseeing West Papua and Papua provinces.

[edit] History

At 1945 TKR(Tentara Keamanan Rakyat / Civil Security Forces) serve as paramilitary and police

[edit] Operational Comands

* Special Forces Command (Kopassus), est 5,530 divided into five groups
* Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), est 35,000
o 1st Division, with 3rd, 13th, and 17th Airborne Brigades
o 2nd Division, with 6th, 9th, 18th Airborne Brigades
o KOSTRAD also commands an independent airborne brigade, an independent cavalry brigade, two field artillery regiments and several combat service support units such as combat engineers.
sumber: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_Army

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Maintaining Security

DPKN - Council for Maintaining Security and the Legal System

In November 1998 the Government formed a new Council for Maintaining Security and the Legal System [Dewan Pemantapan Ketahanan Nasional - Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law] headed by the President but run by the Armed Forces Commander. President Habibie formed the Council with the duties of guiding and coordinating efforts to overcome the crisis threatening national security and the maintenance of the law in an integrated manner. The Council was raised under presidential decree No 191/1998.

Members of the Council include:

* Minister for Defence / Commander Armed Forces
* Minister for Home Affairs
* Minister for Foreign Affairs
* Minister for Justice
* Minister for Communications
* Minister for Finance
* Minister for Information
* Minister for Industry and Trade/Head of National Logistics Agency
* Minister for Farming, Forestry and Plantations
* Minister for Employment
* Minister for Cooperatives
* Minister for Education and Culture
* Minister for Religion
* Minister for Social Affairs
* Minister for State Secretariat
* Minister for Youth and Sport
* The Attorney General
* Chief of National Police
* Head of the Intelligence Coordinating Body (KABAKIN)
* Secretary for the Management of Development Operations
* Chairman of the National Human Rights Commission
* General Chairman of the Indonesian Ulamas Council
* General Chairman of the Indonesian Council of Churches
* General Chairman of the Indonesian Hindu Council
* General Chairman of the Indonesian Buddhist Council

In order to facilitate the day-to-day operations of the Council a Daily Executive is led by Minister for Defence/Commander Armed Forces, General Wiranto, assisted by the Minister for Justice, Muladi, 10 additional ministers [the Ministers for Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Communications, Industry and Trade/Head of National Logistics Agency, Information, Employment, Education and Culture, Religion, Social Affairs, and Youth and Sport ], the Attorney General, the Head of the Intelligence Coordinating Body, and the Secretary for the Management of Development Operations. The Executive will report its activities to the president. The Council would sit in session on an as required basis, as determined by the president.

Institution similar to this in the past, such as the Council of National Defense and Security (WANHANKAMNAS), Institute of National Resistance located beside the office of the coordinating ministry for politics and security as well as agencies set up to handle security matters such as KOPKAMTIB and BAKORSTMAS, have been dominated by the military. But the new council is led by President Habibie, and its membership comprises almost all cabinet ministers. Made up of members of the Cabinet, security and intelligence officials as well as the heads of five religious councils, its stated mission was to control and coordinate efforts to resolve crises threatening national stability. It is reported to be advisory in nature, rather than operational, and does not have "technical authority" as in the case of the former KOPKAMTIB which could arrest and detain people.

sumber:http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/dpkn.htm

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Political Role

Political role of the military

During the Suharto era, the military had a "dual function" (dwifungsi) in Indonesian; first, it would preserve the internal and external security of the country, preserving it as a unified nation, and second, it would ensure that government policy followed a path that the military leadership felt was wise.

This justified substantial military interference in politics. Long-time president Suharto was an army general, and was strongly supported by most of the military establishment. Traditionally a significant number of cabinet members had military backgrounds, while active duty and retired military personnel occupied a large number of seats in the legisalture. Commanders of the various territorial commands played influential roles in the affairs of their respective regions.

Indonesia has not had a substantial conflict with its neighbours since the 1963-1965 confrontation with Malaysia, although competing South China Sea claims, where Indonesia has large natural gas reserves, concern the Indonesian government. Without a credible external threat in the region, the military's primary role in practice has been to assure internal security. Military leaders now say they wish to transform the military to a professional, external security force, but acknowledge that the armed forces will continue to play an internal security role for some time.

In the post-Suharto period since 1998, civilian and military leaders have advocated removing the military from politics (for example, the military's representation in the House of Representatives was reduced and finally ended), but the military's political influence remains extensive. The TNI has been notorious since the massacre of alleged pro-communists in 1965-6 and the East Timor Crisis. In both events, the TNI allegedly mistreated and killed hundreds and thousands of people.

Sumber: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Indonesia

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Armed Forces

Military of Indonesia
Armed Forces of Indonesia (Indonesian: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI , formerly Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, best known by the acronym ABRI comprises approximately 400,000 personnel including the Army (TNI-AD), Navy (including marines) (TNI-AL) , and Air Force (TNI-AU).[citation needed]

The army is by far the largest, with about 300.000 active-duty personnel, compared to around 71,000 in the Navy and 29,000 in the Air Force.[citation needed]

Defense spending in the national budget is less than 1% of GDP, but is supplemented by revenue from many military-run businesses and foundations, both legal and illegal. The force doesn't include paramilitary personnel such as BRIMOB [police mobile brigade], MENWA [university student regiment], and HANSIP [civilian defence].

Sumber: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Indonesia

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Indonesia: Military Business

Indonesia: Military Business Threatens Human Rights
Government Must Reform Defense Finances

[The latest: Human Rights Watch letter dated July 3, 2006 in The Jakarta Post (Re: Indonesian Military and rights, by Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono in The Jakarta Post, June 28)]

(Jakarta, June 21, 2006) – The Indonesian government’s plans to reform military-owned businesses do not sufficiently address the human rights problems fueled by the current system, Human Rights Watch said in a new report released today. The Indonesian military’s independent financing undermines civilian control, contributing to abuses of power by the armed forces and impeding reform.
" The Indonesian government says it wants to professionalize its military, but we’ve seen little evidence of real change. Troops are breaking the law, violating human rights and hiding the money they make on the side. Military reform means getting soldiers out of business and prosecuting those who broke the law. "
Lisa Misol, researcher with the Business and Human Rights Program at Human Rights Watch


Contribute to Human Rights Watch
“The military’s money-making creates an obvious conflict of interest with its proper role,” said Lisa Misol, researcher with the Business and Human Rights Program of Human Rights Watch and author of the report. “Instead of protecting Indonesians, troops are using violence and intimidation to further their business interests. And because the government doesn’t control the purse-strings, it can’t really control them.”

The 136-page report, “Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military’s Economic Activities,” is the most comprehensive account to date of the harmful effect on civilians of the armed forces’ involvement in business. Human Rights Watch called on the Indonesian government to ban all military businesses, reform the budget process and hold military personnel accountable for crimes.

The Indonesian military raises money outside the government budget through a sprawling network of legal and illegal businesses, by providing paid services, and through acts of corruption such as mark-ups in military purchases. Many of these businesses are not controlled by the military’s central command, but they have been allowed to spread as a flawed response to budget constraints.

Longstanding rules against military profit-seeking have not been enforced. The business practices of military enterprises have helped sustain the reputation of the Indonesian military as abusive, corrupt and largely above the law.

“The Indonesian government says it wants to professionalize its military, but we’ve seen little evidence of real change,” Misol said. “Troops are breaking the law, violating human rights and hiding the money they make on the side. Military reform means getting soldiers out of business and prosecuting those who broke the law.”

A 2004 law requires the Indonesian military to withdraw from business by 2009. Civilian and military leaders have pledged to implement the law. But they have not yet adopted regulations spelling out how the government will take over military businesses. Officials say their draft plan may be ready for adoption by August.

“The people of Indonesia pay the price for the military’s economic adventurism,” said Misol. “It’s past time to do something serious about it.”

Human Rights Watch documented several examples of military involvement in business, its negative consequences, and the lack of accountability for economic crimes and associated abuses:

* A series of military-owned businesses in East Kalimantan secured preferred access to forest concessions on land claimed by local indigenous communities. Authorities later said the military companies had engaged in over-logging, illegally exported timber to Malaysia, and contributed to social unrest. The behavior was so egregious that the companies eventually lost the concessions, but did not otherwise face any consequences.
* A coal-mining company in South Kalimantan brought in a military-run cooperative to provide security to help it deal with illegal miners in its concession area. The military organized the miners, used violence and intimidation to keep them in line, and brokered sales of the illegally mined coal. Military authorities declined to crack down on this activity or to punish those involved.
* Companies that use the Indonesian military to provide security for their installations frequently find that these arrangements have been marked by allegations of corruption and abuse, as seen in the continuing controversy over the operations of U.S. mining company Freeport McMoRan in Papua in eastern Indonesia. Investigations have been opened in the United States into allegations that the payments might amount to extortion. There are no plans for an independent investigation in Indonesia to determine whether military officers committed a crime by accepting cash payments from the company.
* Military involvement in illegal business fuels lawlessness and violent conflict. In the most notorious example, soldiers mounted a major attack on a police station in a busy town center in North Sumatra, killing several civilians, over a dispute allegedly involving local drug-trafficking interests. Hundreds of troops were involved, but only 19 were discharged and sentenced to jail following the incident.
* Soldiers in areas of internal conflict in Indonesia commonly engage in predatory economic behavior, such as extortion and property seizures. This was the case in Aceh during the longstanding conflict there. Military demands for bribes have lessened since the devastating tsunami in 2004 and the signing of a peace accord, but ongoing military corruption is driving up the cost of reconstruction and adding to the survivors’ hardship.

Indonesia’s military says that its official budget is sufficient to meet only about half of its needs, and some estimates suggest that the military raises the remainder independently. In March 2006, the military declared that it owned more than 1,500 businesses. Many of them are collapsing after years of mismanagement.

Human Rights Watch acknowledged that Indonesia’s defense budget is low compared to many of its neighbors, but said the problem was not as severe as is often stated because the military also draws on additional funds from other government accounts. These funds are not transparently reported and, Human Rights Watch said, oversight of military finances is very weak.

“It’s the government’s responsibility to finance the military,” Misol said. “Moonlighting by the military is not the answer. Indonesia’s leaders need to agree on an appropriate defense budget that is strictly monitored and reported accurately.”

Human Rights Watch called on the Indonesian government to revamp its plans to take over military business. Government planners have said they will transform the few profitable military enterprises into state-owned companies, but they intend to allow the military to keep the charitable foundations and cooperatives that have been a front for its commercial interests. Officials have also carved out exceptions to the ban on military business that dramatically weaken the potential to clean up military finances.

sumber: http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/21/indone13587.htm

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Indonesian Military

The U.S. Congress Sends Mixed Message On Indonesian Military by Brian McAfee


Brian McAfee 2838 Mason Blvd. Muskegon Heights, MI 49444 Phone: 231-737-8726 e-mail: brimac6@hotmail.com

The U.S. Congress Sends Mixed Message On Indonesian Military

The U.S. Senate voted against giving the human rights abuses countering the House's vote to reinstate funding and training for the Indonesian military. President George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice had been pushing for a full restoration of all military ties to Indonesia because of the ongoing terrorist threat but the persistence of human rights abuses and the corrupt nature of the Indonesian military and political system are problematic when considering the legitimacy of such an idea. " The Indonesian military has a long way to go before it becomes an accountable institution that respects human rights and civilian authority," states Karen Orenstein of East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) The U.S. House of Representatives had passed a bill in June restoring full military aid to Indonesia. On this, Republican congressman from West Michigan, Pete Hoekstra says, "U.S. policy towards Indonesia focuses on assisting and providing humanitarian assistance. Lingering concerns exist regarding human rights issues and violence in places such as Aceh and West Papua. In 2005 the Secretary of State (Condoleezza Rice) certified that Indonesia has met the requirements for International Military Education and Training [IMET)." IMET parallels the School of The American's now The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation both training schools having reputations for churning out soldiers and police that frequently turn up on lists of human rights abusers or worse. While IMET training takes place in the U.S. another program, Joint Combined Exchange Training [JCET] sends special forces teams to other countries, particularly Indonesia. Chalmers Johnson, in his book "Blowback," cites JCET training as a direct link to Indonesian rapes and murders of civilians in Indonesia. Johnson's more recent book, "The Sorrow of Empire," gives an updated account of U.S. empire. The U.S.'s historical relationship with Indonesia is a sordid one. It first came to light when Alan L. Pope, an American pilot, was shot down while on a bombing run over the Indonesian archipelago, after "Rebels" had bombed a church and an outdoor market on May 18, 1958. The U.S. had orchestrated B-26 bombing and strafing raids on the civilian population in an attempt to destabilize the Sukarno government. The number of civilians deaths appear to have been significant but actual numbers have never been established. In 1962 the Kennedy administration informed Sukarno that the U.S. would support the Indonesian military's invasion and occupation of West Papua. Seven years later the Nixon administration recognized the results of a rigged, fraudulent vote in which 1,022 people voted to join Indonesia, in a population of over 800,000. The U.S. recognized this as a legitimate agreement of the Papuan population to join Indonesia. In government documents declassified last year and available on the National Security Archive web site it is shown that the Indonesian takeover of West Papua and fraudulent vote, dubbed a "free choice" by Indonesia and the U.S. was illegitimate and a deception. For 36 years now West Papua has been exploited and abused by the Indonesian military, International Corporations and almost continuous support of the U.S. government. Murders and rapes and forced removal from their land at the hand of the military was becoming commonplace. A U.S. corporation with close ties to the military and notoriety because of its treatment of its workers and the surrounding population in Papua is Freeport, a copper and gold mining company associated with Henry Kissinger. In 1965 the U.S. played a significant role in the overthrow of Sukarno and the subsequent murders of over 500,000 people. In one of the worst mass murders in world history within a short period of time huge numbers of people, sometimes whole families were rounded up and evacuated. Many were members of the PKI, Indonesia's Communist party with an estimated 1 million members, others were random victims. Hundreds of thousands became political prisoners. One of those, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who was sympathetic with the PKI, was placed in an island concentration camp for 17 years. Pramoedya is Indonesian's most famous writer. To this day, those involved in this crime against humanity remain free. The military and Suharto had said their justification for their massive crime was an iminent takeover of Indonesia b y the PKI. In recent years documents have proven this excuse to have been a fabrication. From 1965 until 1999 the Indonesian dictatorship had received the support of the U.S. government. Ten years after the mass murder of over half a million leftists, East Timor, having just received her independence from being a Portuguese colony was invaded by the Indonesian military, and again, with the blessing of the U.S. government. Gerald R. Ford and Henry Kissinger gave the green light and subsequently shipped the Indonesians M-16 rifles and other military equipment. Result, forcible takeover of a small country of 800,000 people, mostly very poor. Within a short period of time 200,000 civilians were killed in the takeover largely with the U.S. supplied rifles. The U.S. supported the events in East Timor until 1991. When an infamous massacre occurred that was covered by the world press only then did the U.S. government restrict some weapons from going to the Indonesian military. In 1998 an Australian newspaper, The Age, had a small report of the discovery of oil in East Timor territorial waters. In 1999 when East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia the U.S. and Australia, Britain and the U.N. supported its move for independence. The Indonesian response was to burn down and destroy as much of the newly independent country on their way out. Aceh in Indonesia's north west is a mostly poor, primarily Muslim area that was hardest hit by last year's Tsunami. Fishing was the primary source of income for many Acehanese when the Tsunami hit. Over 100,000 were said to be lost in the area. About 30 years ago oil and natural gas deposits were discovered in the Aceh region but the people never saw any of the benefits. an Aceh independence movement was formed, GAM. That has been battling the Indonesian government since 1976 with over 10,000 deaths related to the conflict. A peace agreement was just signed but it is unknown if it will hold. No doubt the U.S. and Australia have a keen interest in access to the large oil and natural gas deposits in the area. The Bush administration and those in congress who wish to fully normalize relations with the Indonesian government and restore weapons sales and training to the Indonesian military would be to help in propping up and giving assistance to a corrupted system. This would not be anything new. The U.S. has been doing this with Indonesia for 50 years. The approximately one million deaths in Indonesia committed by the Indonesian military from 1965 on, in a large part had to do with U.S. hegemony, hubris, and greed. It is time for some decency, not business as usual. For updates on Indonesia check out etan.org or tapol.gn.apc.org.

About the Author

Brian McAfee is a free-lance writer living in Muskegon Heights, Michigan

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Sukarno, A Political Biography

Sukarno, A Political Biography by J. D. Legge: nationalism revisited. by Philip Spires


I don't read a lot of history, contemporary or otherwise, and when I do, it is usually in the area of political economy. In recent years, for instance, I have delighted at the scholarship and intellect of Eric Hobsbawm. But what always strikes me about history is how perfect our vision can be from the distance of time. Not so if you are closer, and so I can forgive J. D. Legge my single criticism of his book, Sukarno - A Political Biography, which is its lack of overview. Legge published the book in 1972 and so did not have the luxury of 35 years of clarifying hindsight that we have today.

J. D. Legge's biography charts the life and career of Sukarno in intricate detail. Particularly strong are the descriptions of the internal machinations and wheeler dealing amongst the Indonesian political elite. Sukarno is presented as one of the major political figures of the twentieth century. If anyone should doubt this, then recall that the terms "Third World" and "Non-Aligned", terms that structured our thinking about the world for decades and perhaps still do, would probably not have existed if Sukarno had not promoted them. The former arose out of the 1955 Bandung conference, which Sukarno hosted, and the latter out of continued initiatives involving the Indonesian president. Furthermore Sukarno's significance for the century is also underlined by the fact that the aftermath of the coup that ousted him led to the murder of 250,000 people, while the president himself was allowed to live out his last years and die a natural death. Legge stops short of laying the ultimate responsibility for these deaths at Sukarno's door, and neither can he be certain about the president's relation to the coup. True, he lost power as a result, but he did not lose his life. He lost most of his dignity, but remained such an esteemed figure after 50 years in politics that he retained at least a figurehead status up to his death.

A point that Legge underplays, however, is the relationship between the nationalism that formed the basis of Sukarno's politics and the pragmatism that sought inevitably loose alliances to both define and promote it. One such Sukarno initiative in particular, NASAKOM, may have been responsible ultimately for precipitating the coup and even causing the slaughter.

Sukarno was almost as old as the century, being born in June 1901 in East Java. Legge makes an interesting point about his parents, who met in Singharaja, Bali, while his father was a teacher there. The father was Javanese, a member of the aristocratic priyayi class, but his mother was Balinese and not even a Muslim. I have visited Bali and Singharaja and East Java and can fully appreciate the fundamental differences, both cultural and religious, between these places. And yet, from this mixed parentage there was born a figure who consistently espoused nationalism as a defining ideology. But from the start, and perhaps because of his background, it was a syncretic nationalism that tried to create unity by bridging difference.

Initially, of course, this nationalism was defined via opposition to Dutch colonial rule. It was a nationalism that brought the young Sukarno into conflict with the authorities, led to periods of imprisonment and exile. Nothing strange here. The twentieth century is full of such figures who struggled against externally-imposed colonial rule. In the Second World War, Sukarno, like Laurel in the Philippines, collaborated with the Japanese. But whereas to the north Laurel was eventually disgraced by the association, Sukarno found himself in 1945 the president of an independent Indonesia. And here, perhaps is where the nationalist ideology became, out of necessity, essentially pragmatic.

As an ideology, nationalism claims it expresses a single identity or culture, often defined by language or religion. And this despite the fact that there are almost no nations that actually display the homogeneity that the ideology assumes. It thus has the capacity to become an exclusive force in direct contradiction to its stated aim. Thus nationalism inevitably is an ideology that is easiest to define and promulgate by opposing what it is not, rather than defining precisely what it is. We only have to think of the agendas of the so-called nationalist parties and movements in contemporary Europe, and how they crystallize around opposition. In Britain, we have the United Kingdom Independence Party, UKIP, which is nationalist because it opposes the European Union. And we have the National Front, nationalist because it opposes immigration. The list could be a long one. So nationalism often must be defined in relation to what we are not, rather than via what we are.

If you live in a country subjected to colonial rule, it is surely easy to define nationalism around concepts of independence and self-government. One these things have been achieved, however, the focus that defined the nationalism is removed. If it is to continue as an ideology for an independent nation, it must change, one option is for it to be elevated to state-worship, almost to the status of a national religion. The North Korea of Kim Il Sung was this route in extremis. But in a country as vast as Indonesia, the social conformity this route requires could never have been achieved.

So Sukarno took the other route that can sustain nationalism as a state ideology, which was expansionism, coupled with attempts to create coalitions across political ideology and religion. The expansionist tendency led to the incorporation of West Irian into Indonesia. It also led to Sukarno's opposition to the establishment of a Malaysian Federation and thus to several years of war in Borneo. It might be argued the same need for expansion to bolster nationalism led, under Suharto, to the invasion of East Timor. The point here is that the external positions are adopted in order to define internal political identity.

As well as promoting an external focus, alliances and coalitions must be erected internally to create at least a semblance of unity. Sukarno's NASAKOM was such an attempt, an initiative to unite Nasionalisme, Agama and Komunisme, Nationalism, Religion and Communism. And so the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, was part of an equation whose result was always going to be a problem, given the ubiquity of the cold War and the proximity of China. When we consider the difficulty of creating unity out of such an admixture, we then appreciate the need for nationalism to retain its external focus. No nationalist agenda can cut across ideological differences that are global. In Sukarno's case, effectively the Cold War won. The internal tensions had to be resolved and, in Indonesia's case, it led to military action, the slaughter of 250,000 communist sympathisers and anyone else who got in the way, and the emergence of an initially pro-Western government under Suharto.

But despite this unsatisfactory end for Sukarno's nationalism, J. D. Legge reminds us of his achievements. Modern Indonesia came into being under Sukarno's leadership and vision. The politics of the region and of the century were influenced by him. And he was leader of one of the world's most populous countries for over two decades. Certainly he was a great figure, but, because of his use of syncretic nationalism, he was not a contributor to political thought and so, perhaps, his influence died with him. J. D. Legge's Sukarno - A Political Biography is a superb, scholarly and measured account of this life and career.

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